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FIGURING AMBIVALENCE, 
CAPTURING THE POLITICAL
An Everyday Perspective
Brigitte Bargetz1
The notion of ambivalence currently seems to be an invigorating figure 
with heuristic potential in political, social, and art theory.2 It refers to a 
plurality of possibilities, a paradoxical multiplicity, and a complex rela-
tionality. It foregrounds thinking in terms of indeterminacy and incom-
mensurability, as well as in terms of the possible. Ambivalence has been 
deployed in positive ways, as offering political promise, while, at the 
same time, being regarded with suspicion.
 Even though ambivalence is popular, it often remains vague. This 
paper aims at contributing to a clarification of this notion by drawing 
on Henri Lefebvre’s critical theory of the everyday.3 Through the way he 
refers to the notions of ambivalence and ambiguity, Lefebvre describes a 
complex relation between conditions and events, between the virtual 
and the actual. Reading his theory against the background of current 
political theories, I will unfold a conceptualization of ambivalence that 
may inspire a delineation of the political, focusing on questions around 
subjects and agency, decisions and un/decidability. I will propose read-
ing Lefebvre’s theory of the everyday as a contribution to political and 
social theory, emphasizing how subjects are involved in and attached to 
political moments of a certain historical present. For in his theory, the 
everyday is not conceived as separate from the sites of politics and eco-
nomics, but is instead closely related to them, embodying their ‘imma-
nent force’.4 I will explore how Lefebvre’s notion of ambivalence allows 
us to theorize individuals’ complex and complicated involvement in 
relations of power and domination without relying on absolute deter-
minism or on the idea of a sovereign resistant subject. Such thinking 
informs a theory of the political that highlights the subject without, 
however, falling into the traps of an individualistic perspective. Instead, 
it attends to the way subjects are binding and bound to specific histori-
cal moments and conditions. Thus, it helps to reconfigure a more 
nuanced understanding of political agency as a force of change as well 
as of maintenance, exercised ‘within the spaces of ordinariness’, within 
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the everyday.5 Furthermore, it allows for investigating normative ques-
tions when thinking about political strategies. Here, I propose an under-
standing of ambivalence that is neither only positive nor merely critical, 
since it informs both processes of domination and modes of disruption. 
I begin by engaging with political conceptualizations of ambivalence, 
which relate to different historical moments as well as to different 
modes and mechanisms of ambivalence. In order to explore the theo-
ries’ conceptual potentials, I refer to the figures of multiplicity and 
multistability. While this perspective makes it possible to introduce 
questions about subjects and agency, it also reveals the limits when it 
comes to theorizing the role of individuals’ practices. For further elabo-
ration on this point, I engage with Henri Lefebvre’s critical theory of the 
everyday. His writings on ambivalence and ambiguity, as I will illus-
trate, refer to individuals’ practices, and open up a thorough and com-
plex way to relate moments of process and decision. I will conclude by 
elaborating on how this assemblage of ambivalence and ambiguity can 
offer inspiring insights for a theory of the political and refine an under-
standing of political agency.
P O L I T I C S ,  M U L T I P L I C I T Y ,  A N D  M U L T I S T A B I L I T Y
Poststructuralist and postmodern critiques of Western grand narratives 
have challenged certain characteristics of Western modernity. Instead of 
rationality, knowledge, progress, and certainty, notions such as frag-
mentation, chaos, uncertainty, contingency, and paradox have become 
central topics in political philosophy and social theory. In the following 
section I sketch out four theories, putting different figures of ambiva-
lence in focus. Drawing on these figures, each theory attempts to move 
away from determinist thinking of the political and of social formation 
and instead sheds light on modes of political agency. Each theory not 
only requires a specific conceptual tool, but also refers to a particular 
historical moment as well as to a particular political mode of being. 
While I explore these theories separately, I end up discussing how they 
mobilize figures of multiplicity and multistability. This framework helps 
to illustrate the differences, and even more so the theoretical and politi-
cal flaws, when ambivalence is understood as mere plurality without 
acknowledging matters of power. Furthermore, the figure of multistabil-
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ity also leads us to questions of subjectivity and decision-making and 
opens perspectives that help to epitomize political agency.
T H E  P O L I T I C A L  DY N A M I C S  O F  A M B I VA L E N C E  A N D  T H E  D E L U S I V E  B E L I E F 
I N  C O H E R E N C E
In his book Modernity and Ambivalence (1991) Zygmunt Bauman 
argues for the political recognition of ambivalence.6 He argues that the 
fight against ambivalence in (Western) modernity7 has not simply failed, 
but has rather provoked new ambivalences that, according to him, have 
largely contributed to a politics of violence, such as Othering, exclusion, 
and even genocide. Bauman defines ambivalence as ‘the possibility of 
assigning an object or an event to more than one category’.8 Conceived 
as ‘disorder’, ambivalence evokes a feeling of ‘discomfort’9 because situ-
ations can be read in multiple ways and thus imply the necessity of 
deciding between alternatives. Identified with a ‘feeling of indecision’, 
‘undecidability’, and thus with ‘chaos and lack of control, and hereby 
frightening’, ambivalence is juxtaposed – a necessary corollary – to the 
promise of a coherent world and the ‘quest for order’.10 Order, Bauman 
claims, becomes an ‘obsession’,11 while ambivalence is ‘marked for 
extinction’.12 Here, ambivalence does not point to contradictory posi-
tions or interests. Rather, it is implying a dominant value or belief that 
marks a political moment and historical time, and the way people 
attach to it. Modernity’s aspiration to regulate social questions techno-
logically represents for Bauman an effect of this belief in and search for 
coherence. As such, this belief has both constituted the conditions of the 
Holocaust and legitimized it: ‘Without being the sufficient cause of the 
genocide, modernity is its necessary condition.’13 
 At the same time, the desire for order produces disorder. Hence, 
ambivalence was not only fought against in modern societies but was 
also further engineered throughout this struggle. This suggests that 
ambivalence is inherent to modernity, in so far as modernity produces 
what it has been meant to extinguish. As modernity’s ‘waste’, ambiva-
lence is a trope of ‘the other of order’.14 
 Bauman criticizes the ignoring of ambivalence and instead insists 
on its acknowledgment, which means teasing out its opportunities and 
risks. While unravelling the ‘emancipatory potential of contingency-as-
destiny’, he addresses the problematic aspects of ambivalence by reveal-
ing, for example, the ‘burden’ of the ‘privatization of ambivalence’.15 
The retreat of the modern state and the increase of consumer culture, he 
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argues, create the problem of individualization, that is, the necessity 
that ‘individuals must face the problem of ambivalence alone’.16 For 
Bauman, ambivalence constitutes a critical category for grasping West-
ern modern, as well as postmodern, political and social conditions, and 
attempting to expunge it produces only more ambivalence. Instead, 
ambivalence has to be acknowledged as a social and political force 
without ignoring its problematic implications.
A N  A M B I VA L E N T  W O R L D  A N D  T H E  F I G U R E  O F  ‘A N D ’
While Bauman regards ambivalence as a politically specific dimension 
in modern Western societies, Ulrich Beck considers it as a politically and 
socially emerging moment in late modernity: the so-called second or 
reflexive modernity. This new ‘age of ambivalence’,17 he argues, has 
been emerging since the end of the Cold War, picturing the end of class 
antagonism and the rise of a new political force, namely the global 
threat of risks. While Bauman unmasks modernity’s deluded faith in 
certainty, Beck points to the transformation from (modern) certainty to 
the uncertainty of the ‘risk society’.18 This uncertainty is to be found in 
an increasing individualization as well as in new nuclear and ecological 
risks, which have spread globally beyond national borders – as the 
tragic example of Chernobyl demonstrated. These new threats, how-
ever, are only one part of the story. Its other part, Beck emphasizes, con-
sists of an increasing number of possibilities that he metaphorically 
describes with the simple word ‘and’.19 This ‘and’ becomes apparent, for 
instance, ‘in a contradictory multiple engagement’ in which it is possible 
to think and act ‘as a right-winger and a left-winger, radically and con-
servatively, democratically and undemocratically, politically and unpo-
litically, all at the same time’.20 Consequently, common political coordi-
nates like ‘right and left, conservative and socialistic, retreat and partici-
pation’21 are also no longer relevant. While in Beck’s view, in modern 
times politics had been frozen in a Schmittian friend–enemy dialectics, 
the rising reflexive modernization opens up new possibilities for think-
ing and acting beyond these distinctions. Hence, the end of political 
contradictions also manifests itself in new possibilities for political 
agency outside traditional political institutions like the state or corpora-
tions. Introducing the term ‘subpolitics’,22 Beck identifies these new pos-
sibilities in social movements or civic engagement. 
 For Beck, ambivalence characterizes both the political and the con-
ceptual frame for imagining new political forms. ‘And’ points at a plu-
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rality of possibilities: a plurality that includes and relates seemingly 
incommensurable positions. With the figure of ‘and’, he not only under-
lines shifting realities but also emphasizes the requirement to think poli-
tics anew. The end of dialectic politics should also lead to an end of dia-
lectical thinking. Tired of the mourning of political pessimism, he advo-
cates instead – as his book title indicates – a reinvention of politics as a 
politics of the possible. 
 Both Beck and Bauman criticize political determinism with the fig-
ure of ambivalence – Beck by interrogating a pre-given political frame, 
Bauman by questioning technological endeavours as a remedy for social 
and political problems as well as for narratives of finality. At the same 
time, while Beck stresses a new political plurality and political agency, 
also beyond traditional political institutions, he largely ignores those 
powerful implications of ambivalence on which Bauman explicitly 
focuses.23
C O LO N I A L  A M B I VA L E N C E
While Bauman refers to ambivalence as a rather general Western mod-
ern principle, Homi Bhabha perceives ambivalence as part of a specific 
power relation, namely the colonial relation. Bhabha turns to the idea 
of ambivalence in order to challenge and undo the monolithic binary 
logic of the relation between colonizers and colonized; for such a binary 
leaves no possibilities for resistance and agency. Instead, he highlights 
the colonized subject and considers within ‘the ambivalence of colonial 
discourse’24 an empowering potential for those who are discriminated 
against. For Bhabha, there is an ambivalence in the relation between 
colonizer and colonized, evident in the inability of the postcolonial 
authority to identically reproduce itself. ‘The ambivalence of colonial 
authority repeatedly turns from mimicry – a difference that is almost 
nothing but not quite – to menace – a difference that is almost total but 
not quite.’25 Ambivalence provides a political figure of ‘in-between’26 
and indicates that the colonizer’s position is altered. Without ignoring 
the hierarchical relation between colonizer and colonized, Bhabha also 
conceives a rupture: ‘disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse 
also disrupts its authority’.27 Ambivalence is then the mode through 
which Bhabha sees colonial power as never fully coherent, uniform, and 
static, but as an unstable colonial authority. This carries with it the pos-
sibility of its own undoing.
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 Bhabha insists on the ambivalent structure as well as the function-
ing of colonial power because it allows him to identify possible sites for 
subaltern resistance and agency. ‘The ambivalence of mimicry – almost 
but not quite – suggests that the fetishized colonial culture is potentially 
and strategically an insurgent counter-appeal.’28 His idea of ambivalence 
emphasizes incompleteness and constant modifications within colonial 
discourse, indicating disruptions, inconveniences, and insecurities of 
colonial representation. In doing so, Bhabha interrogates a rigid concep-
tion of power and domination – one that fosters a dualistic offender–
victim understanding. At the same time, his idea of resistance and 
agency stemming from the ambivalence of the colonial discourse does 
not primarily point to a conscious and intentional subject, but is rather 
considered as an effect of the colonial process itself.
A  Q U E E R – F E M I N I S T  P O L I T I C S  O F  PA R A D OX
While ambivalence is Bhabha’s figure of departure for challenging 
binary thinking, it is the notion of paradox that opens up such a poten-
tial for Antke Engel. Her starting point is not a postcolonial critique, 
but a queer–feminist one, for the emphasis on paradox enables her to 
unfold a critique of heteronormativity and to stress a politics of potenti-
ality from a queer–feminist perspective.29 Engel aims at ‘challenging the 
heterosexual norm and the premise of binary gender difference’ as well 
as the ‘complementary, hierarchical divide of subject and object of 
desire’.30 Like Bhabha, she wishes to move beyond the idea of coherence 
and simple binary oppositions and argues for anti-identitarian and 
destabilizing politics. Turning to paradox is important for her because it 
enables the renegotiation of understandings of power that – implicitly 
or explicitly – rely on the idea of antagonism. Such exploration of the 
concept of power seeks to address the question of agency, as it did for 
Bhabha. Paradox, Engel argues, carries a political potential as an anti- 
and non-hegemonic strategy. While, for Bhabha, ambivalence consti-
tutes a critical figure for questioning the alleged closure and coherence 
of colonial power in depicting a space in-between, Engel deploys the fig-
ure of paradox in order to map queer political strategies beyond identi-
tarian logics. Here, paradox is not only some condition to be uncovered 
and appropriated politically: rather, a ‘queer politics of paradox’31 
implies a normative dimension. In other words, paradox is not only a 
means but also an end: something to be achieved. Against traditional 
political theory that relates paradox to ‘inauthenticity or alienation’ but 
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also against a ‘depoliticized pluralism’,32 Engel’s queer paradoxical poli-
tics suggests an intervention into hegemonic regimes. It may trouble 
rigid and binary identity constructions and, through its paradoxical 
pleasures, fuel political struggles. For her, such a queer politics is possi-
ble despite the tendency of a neoliberal politics of paradox, which she 
identifies in the simultaneous demand of freedom and responsibility.
 In order to be able to grasp the queer political potential of para-
dox, Engel insists upon distinguishing between the notions of paradox, 
ambiguity, and contradiction. She defines paradox as a permanent state 
of tension, set in motion through the relation between incompatible ele-
ments. Unlike paradox, ambiguities do not imply incompatibility, but 
undecidability. Here, the relation is produced through ‘continuously 
shifting perspectives’.33 Ambiguities point to polysemy, which can nei-
ther be dissolved nor fixed. Like paradox, contradiction implies incom-
patible oppositions. In contrast to the figure of the paradox, however, 
contradiction requires that the entities constituting it are identifiable 
and separable. Thus, paradox mediates between ambiguity and contra-
diction,34 indicating that it can turn to both relative ambiguity and 
antagonistic contradiction. 
 For Engel, paradox points at politics beyond the ‘illusion of coher-
ence’, recognizing that processes of identity construction and collectivi-
ties are always ‘precarious and provisional’.35 Following poststructural-
ist debates about the political, which emphasize politics as precarious 
acts of closure and argue against pre-given foundations for politics, 
Engel promotes an understanding of doing politics as making ‘decisions 
under conditions of undecidability’.36 On the one hand, this implies fos-
tering an agonistic, rather than a consensual, understanding of politics 
given that paradox refers to tensions. On the other hand, Engel empha-
sizes politics in terms of decisions. Resisting familiar decisions and 
introducing instead uncertainty or at least delay, a politics of paradox 
may entail a multiplication of possibilities, a troubling of stabilities, and 
the deferral of decisions. Unlike Beck, who focuses on the possibilities 
that come along with political ambivalence and thus plurality, Engel 
also accentuates the problematics related to a politics of paradox. She 
refers to the possible alliances between neoliberal and queer paradoxical 
politics, both of which point at the impossibility of closures, although 
from different angles. Furthermore, she criticizes the model of plurality 
that relies on the integration and recognition of minorities without 
changing the hegemonic political horizon.37 For Engel, a politics of par-
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adox does not uncritically affirm plurality, nor does it ignore existing 
power relations. It may be at the same time problematic and anticipa-
tory. It describes both ongoing neoliberal politics and non-hegemonic, 
non-normative, and non-identitarian queer strategies. Acknowledging 
the paradox of neoliberal politics, Engel nonetheless emphasizes its sub-
versive potential. Her conceptual and political aim is a critique of iden-
tity politics, which relies on binary identitarian logics. With the concept 
of the paradox, she not only sharpens the problematics related to binary 
models, but also suggests a framework for thinking about ways of 
transgressing such models.
P O L I T I C A L  M U LT I P L I C I T Y  A N D / O R  M U LT I S TA B I L I T Y ?
All four approaches use different figures of multiplicity in order to dis-
play a diagnosis of a certain political moment, describing specific politi-
cal modes and reconsidering politics in terms of political potentiality, as 
well as (non-normative and non-coherent) political strategies. The theo-
ries aim to reject determinism while exploring how, in different ways, 
political agency might be redefined through an emphasis on plurality, 
incoherence, ruptures, and undecidability as moments where agency 
may reside and from where it may evolve. The concepts of ambivalence 
and paradox, as well as the figure of ‘and’, hint at a critique of coher-
ence and certainty, at an impossibility of total closure, as well as at a 
plurality of possibilities. Bauman’s notion of ambivalence and Beck’s 
figure of ‘and’ assume polysemy and the coexistence of various possibil-
ities that are simultaneously at work. As Bauman concedes, ambiva-
lence is the possibility of grasping one event or object in different ways. 
Although he considers ambivalence in terms of multiplicity, he does not 
posit it uncritically. Unlike Beck, who stresses an understanding of plu-
rality as desirable and even emancipatory, Bauman also problematizes 
such a multiplicity of choices. Ambivalence is, for instance, problematic 
when it leaves the individuals alone with their choices. Hence, it does 
not simply indicate the possibility of grasping an event in different 
ways; nor is it merely the inevitable product of striving for certainty. 
For Bauman, the notion of ambivalence also hints at the necessity to 
decide. Stressing this point of ambivalence beyond simple plurality may 
best be seen through the figure of multistability. Multistable figures 
such as the Rubin vase or Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit do not refer to an 
unlimited number of possibilities. Since it is impossible to see both fig-
ures at the same time, multistable figures evoke the viewer’s need to 
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decide between seeing the two faces or the vase, the duck or the rab-
bit.38 Multistability thus implies both undecidability and the need to 
decide. The coexistence of possibilities neither indicates infinity nor 
offers synthesis. Apprehending ambivalence and paradox as figures of 
multistability evokes an understanding of not only multiple but also 
related aspects and realities. While the figure of multiplicity as well as 
Beck’s figure of ‘and’ indicates multiplication, endless plurality, and the 
equal coexistence of different possibilities, multistability articulates the 
relative stability of existing conditions, as well as the need to decide.
 Referring to the elaborated theories, the figure of multistability is 
intriguing because it helps to reveal crucial political and theoretical con-
sequences. It allows for a critique of postmodern plurality understood 
as ‘anything goes’, and relates to questions of structures, conditions, 
and relations of power and domination. While Beck highlights new 
political forms and modes of acting through newly observable and 
emerging ambivalences, he hardly addresses the conditions these new 
forms of political agency are embedded in. These aspects, however, are 
crucial for Bhabha. His use of ambivalence highlights the instability of 
colonial power relations, pointing at a potential for political agency, 
while avoiding the disavowal of the powerful relation between coloniz-
ers and colonized. He identifies this relation as one that may be altered, 
opened up, and reorganized, but also as one that should never be 
ignored in its powerful dimensions. Engel’s notion of paradox follows a 
similar path. For her, thinking in terms of paradox allows for the recog-
nition of the ways the plurality of possibilities is impeded – as in regard 
to a binary gender order. Paradox embraces that some identities, posi-
tions, or meanings are more likely to be recognized than others, without 
necessarily changing the underlying structures of inequality. The frame 
of multistability makes it possible to emphasize that neither ambiva-
lence nor paradox are simply to be affirmed. Unlike multiplicity – 
which would merely privilege a plurality of possibilities, dissolution, 
and multiplication – ambivalence and paradox in terms of multistability 
inform both possibilities and impossibilities.
 Addressing the heuristic tool of multistability as opposed to multi-
plicity can help shift our attention to relations of power and domina-
tion, as well as to the question of making decisions under these condi-
tions. However, its potential is also limited. Picturing mainly dualistic 
models – like the Rubin vase or Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit – multista-
bility also evokes what Bhabha and Engel are criticizing: that is, a rigid 
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binary logic, with seemingly coherent, unchangeable positions, perspec-
tives, or identities. Therefore I suggest that the potential of the proposed 
models of ambivalence can best be understood through the figures of 
multiplicity and multistability. While multiplicity accentuates a multipli-
cation of possibilities, and offers a frame against monocausality and 
finality, ultimately also irritating stabilities, multistability also highlights 
the forces of existing stabilities and how these relate to activities and 
decisions – however limited these decisions may be. As such, these activ-
ities also comprise mechanisms of producing, adjusting to, and rework-
ing different aspects. They imply political agency as a force of change 
and/or maintenance. Invoking these aspects of decision and activity also 
relates to the question of the subject. All four theories of ambivalence or 
paradox take into consideration, though differently, the subject. Politi-
cal subjects beyond traditional institutions lie at the heart of Beck’s rein-
vention of the political. For Bhabha and Engel, the constitution of the 
(colonial, gendered, and sexualized) subject embedded in binary power 
structures is crucial to their analysis. Like Bauman, Engel highlights ide-
ological dimensions of subject constitution.39 In both approaches, sub-
jects are part of ideological interpellation processes, either in terms of 
modern beliefs in certainty or as neoliberal paradoxical demands 
between freedom and responsibility. As Bhabha also reveals, subjects 
are both challenged to deal with ambivalent and paradoxical conditions 
while participating in their production and reproduction. 
 Like these approaches, Henri Lefebvre’s theory offers a perspective 
on political agency that challenges determinism without ignoring 
dimensions of power and repression. I suggest understanding his theo-
rizing of ambivalence and ambiguity along the lines of the interrelated 
figures of multiplicity and multistability. However, his perspective also 
adds something to this framework and the elaborated figures of ambiv-
alence. While all four theories of ambivalence deal with the question of 
the subject, Lefebvre’s approach furthermore introduces the following 
questions: How can we theorize individuals being caught in particular 
situations? What are the specific modes and mechanisms of their bind-
ings and entanglements?
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H E N R I  L E F E B V R E :  A M B I V A L E N C E S  O F  T H E  E V E R Y D A Y 
The French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1901–
1991) is often mentioned alongside thinkers like Theodor W. Adorno, 
Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukács, and Herbert Marcuse.40 His work, however, 
has for a long time been little appreciated compared to these theoreti-
cians, resulting in Lefebvre even being conceived as the ‘ignored philos-
opher’ during his lifetime.41 Currently, he is probably best known within 
the fields of critical geography and urban studies.42 His book The Pro-
duction of Space (1974) has been highly influential for the so-called 
spatial turn in social and cultural studies. Besides this well-known 
work, it is Lefebvre’s long-term thinking about the everyday that may 
be regarded as the core of his theorization. His interest in the everyday 
had already emerged in the 1920s and remained his further concern 
until the 1980s, most explicitly in his trilogy on the Critique of Every-
day Life.43 Against the long-held philosophical neglect of the everyday, 
which, according to Lefebvre, was only partially overcome by Karl 
Marx’s introduction of labour and ‘real life’ into philosophy, Lefebvre 
develops a critical theory of everyday life, inquiring into modern capi-
talist times and how these relate to everyday practices.44 He describes 
the everyday as a ‘complex phenomenon’ that is both a ‘capitalist mode 
of production’ and a ‘modality of administering society’,45 and argues 
that capitalism resides in daily practices, where it hides its immanent 
force and manages to survive. But it is also in everyday life that a revo-
lutionary transformation of society has to be realized. The everyday is 
therefore not an autonomous sphere that is either conceived as alienated 
or ‘assigned to resistant subordinates’.46 For Lefebvre, the everyday is an 
assemblage of practices deeply embedded in political power relations. 
Thus, a critique of everyday life also allows for a critique of the political 
sphere. Or, in Lefebvre’s words, a critique of everyday life ‘encompasses 
a critique of the political realms by everyday social practice and vice 
versa’.47 
 Against the background of these political and theoretical premises, 
I consider Lefebvre’s theory of the everyday, and especially his notions 
of ambivalence and ambiguity, to be productive in so far as it allows for 
sharpening an understanding of ambivalence in a way that ultimately 
can inspire a theory of the political. 
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A M B I VA L E N C E  A N D  A M B I G U I T Y :  C L A R I F Y I N G  G R O U N D S
‘The everyday is ambiguous and contradictory’48 Lefebvre writes. In the 
second volume of the Critique of Everyday Life, he identifies ambiguity 
as one of twelve specific categories of everyday life, indicating at the 
same time that a distinction exists between ambiguity and ambivalence 
(though he never fully elucidates it). Taking up this little elaborated dis-
tinction, I suggest mapping his notion of ambiguity as distinct from, but 
related to, ambivalence. My reading draws on Lefebvre’s understanding 
of ambiguity elaborated in the first volume of the Critique of Everyday 
Life, in which he develops some of the central features of his notion of 
ambiguity. Turning to this early conceptualization, I argue, helps to 
tease out the differentiation, but also the connection, between ambigu-
ity and ambivalence that infuses his later work. 
 In order to clarify an understanding of ambivalence and ambiguity, 
it might be useful to examine the current meanings of these two 
notions: not only since ambiguity and ambivalence are often used inter-
changeably, but also since Lefebvre suggests a rather uncommon usage 
that nevertheless may be better understood in reference to the more 
common one. Ambiguity dates back to the fifteenth century, while 
ambivalence only to the twentieth century.49 In the Oxford English Dic-
tionary ambivalence is defined as the ‘coexistence in one person of con-
tradictory emotions or attitudes (as love and hatred) towards a person 
or thing’.50 It refers to a state of mixed and even contradictory feelings 
towards something or someone. In its definition of ambiguity, by con-
trast, the Oxford English Dictionary mentions ‘uncertainty’ and ‘dubi-
ety’ as well as the meaning of a ‘word or phrase susceptible of more 
than one meaning; an equivocal expression’. Furthermore, it differenti-
ates between a subjective and an objective use of the idea. The subjec-
tive understanding – which indicates a ‘wavering of opinion; hesitation, 
doubt, uncertainty, as to one’s course’ – is, however, conceived to be 
outdated and obsolete. Instead, the current usage refers to the objective 
understanding, that is, the ‘capability of being understood in two or 
more ways; double or dubious signification, ambiguousness’. Interest-
ingly, the subjective use of ambiguity and the notion of ambivalence 
seem close to one another, as both relate to an inner state: one of uncer-
tainty (for ambiguity) or even of conflict (for ambivalence). The com-
mon understanding, however, distinguishes ambivalence in terms of an 
inner dimension from ambiguity as a multiplicity of meanings and signi-
fications, revealing also a disciplinary dimension. Linguistic dictionaries 
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mainly refer to the notion of ambiguity, invoking processes of significa-
tion and indicating that a signifier can be interpreted in different ways; 
the notion of ambivalence emerges out of psychology and psychoanaly-
sis, referring to an affective ambivalence such as love–hate, as Sigmund 
Freud and Eugen Bleuler have explained it.51 
 This distinction between a psychological phenomenon (ambiva-
lence as personal inner conflict or as conflicting affective attitudes) and 
a linguistic phenomenon (ambiguity as a plurality of meanings) is simi-
larly echoed in Lefebvre. He reveals a general tendency to emphasize a 
distinction between psychological ambivalences and sociological ambi-
guities. Here, ambivalence refers to the conflict of an individual, while 
ambiguity defines a condition that is ‘offered to an individual’.52 At the 
same time, Lefebvre’s position towards this distinction remains some-
how blurry. On the one hand, he criticizes certain philosophers’ efforts 
to transform the sociological category of ambiguity into an ontological 
one, as this is impossible because ‘ambiguity prevents awareness of 
ambiguity’.53 On the other hand, he argues that ambiguity can never 
last, but has a beginning and an end. Here, he emphasizes moments of 
illumination, moments where ‘ambiguity bursts asunder in contradic-
tions’ – contradictions between the ‘possibilities longed for and disap-
pointingly fulfilled’.54 I draw on this last idea, that is, the moment of 
becoming explicit and of the unfolding of ambiguity, because this 
moment can be tied to Lefebvre’s expression of ambivalence. It allows 
us to elaborate a complex understanding of conditions, processes, and 
events, and therefore helps to address the question of political agency as 
a question of how individuals are attached to, and at the same time 
involved in, the re/production of historical moments. I suggest under-
standing Lefebvre’s considerations in terms of transgressing a discipli-
narily guided distinction between ambivalence and ambiguity. Ambiva-
lence and ambiguity then do not refer to a distinction between inner 
conflicts and conflicting conditions, but between virtual polarities and a 
manifest conflict: that is, between indifference and the need to decide.
 It is in the extended re-edition of the first volume of the Critique of 
Everyday Life that Lefebvre foregrounds an understanding of ambigu-
ity, relating it to the idea of praxis.55 Emphasizing praxis does not mean 
pointing merely to processes and the idea of transformation, since one 
of praxis’ essential tenets concerns decisions. Praxis, Lefebvre argues, 
implies the ‘requirement to act and to make decisions’; praxis ‘imposes 
choice’.56 This understanding of praxis and decision becomes decisive 
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for his deployment of ambiguity. Whereas ambiguity suggests different 
and coexisting possibilities, Lefebvre explains that this – even some-
times charming – ‘state of possibility’57 can never endure. Ambiguity’s 
coexisting possibilities are rather constantly interrupted through deci-
sions, choices, and judgements. In Lefebvre’s view, both philosophers 
and psychologists have largely ignored this practical materialist dimen-
sion of ambiguity. They have ‘confused the issue [of ambiguity] by 
sometimes attributing this “being-there” of results to consciousness or 
being, rather than to action and decisions’.58 Within such a frame, ambi-
guity is reduced either to an ontological phenomenon or to a state of 
cognition. Here, Lefebvre closely follows Marx’s double critique of con-
temporary philosophy that emphasizes abstract thinking or being with-
out acting.59 Like Marx, Lefebvre highlights the material as well as the 
practical and transformative dimension. ‘[F]rom the ambiguity of con-
sciousness and situations’ he argues, ‘spring forth actions, events, 
results, without warning.’60 He adds: ‘These, at least, have clear-cut out-
lines. They maintain a hard, incisive objectivity which constantly dis-
perse the luminous vapours of ambiguity – only to let them rise once 
again.’61 Lefebvre indicates a relation of tension that is opened between 
ambiguities and the always-present necessity of judging and making 
decisions. Ambiguities and decisions are thus closely related, as they 
mark permanently fluctuating modes. In their complexity and connec-
tion, they embrace a process and indicate a transformation in time.
 Lefebvre further explores this tension between ambiguity and deci-
sion in the second volume of his Critique of Everyday Life. I suggest 
that paying attention to the distinction he draws between ambiguity and 
ambivalence allows for a more precise theorization of the interplay 
between decisions and ambiguity, and thus for conceptualizing how 
individuals are not only caught in, but also create, particular situations. 
Contradictions, Lefebvre argues, are closely linked to both ambivalence 
and ambiguity. Yet, he identifies a different exigency in the need to 
decide. Ambivalence either points to the immediate need to decide, or to 
the fact that a decision has already been made: ‘In the case of ambiva-
lence it is within the consciousness of an active individual that the prob-
lem of conflict emerges; with his back to the wall, he has to choose.’62 
On the contrary, there is no need to decide when it comes to ambiguity. 
Here, the individual ‘adopts a kind of temporary and undisciplined 
indifference; one day, soon perhaps, he will have to opt; but the 
moment of choice has not yet arrived’.63 In contrast to dictionaries’ defi-
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nitions that anchor ambivalence within an individual’s attitude, I under-
stand Lefebvre’s notion of ambivalence as describing the position taken 
towards a specific contradictory situation where the immanent force of 
contradictions – of past and present – become explicit because of this 
need to make a decision. Ambivalence is at the same time an unfolding 
and a suspension of ambiguity; it expresses a moment of practice. While 
ambivalence indicates a conflict, a compelling challenge vis-à-vis an 
emerging problem, the notion of ambiguity offers an understanding of 
the variety of possibilities at work at a certain moment. Ambiguity does 
not necessarily evoke controversy, but rather ‘several virtual polari-
ties’.64 It includes the gesture of a coming decision, implying, however, 
its final suspension. 
A M B I VA L E N C E  =  A M B I G U I T Y  +  D E C I S I O N
Following Lefebvre’s explanations, I suggest reading ambivalence and 
ambiguity as closely related, elucidated in the equation ambivalence = 
ambiguity + decision. Such a reading may also be pushed to Lefebvre’s 
mention of a ‘dialectical movement’, present in the expression ‘ambigu-
ity/decision’.65 I propose embracing this dialectical mode with Lefebvre’s 
notion of ambivalence, and thus relating ambiguity and ambivalence for 
four conceptual reasons.66 My reading draws on his earlier reflections 
on ambiguities interrupted by decisions. In his first volume of the Cri-
tique of Everyday Life, he observes that the ‘“yes and no” of ambiguity 
and the suspension of judgment’ are replaced ‘with the dilemma of 
action’.67 In the second volume, I argue, he explores the notion of 
ambivalence in order to think through this moment of replacement. As I 
have demonstrated earlier, Lefebvre identifies ambivalence as the very 
moment of decision. Ambivalence unfolds at the time when suspension 
comes to an end. Ambiguity, in contrast, is shaped by a variety of possi-
bilities, none of which has to be chosen immediately; it marks indiffer-
ence. Theorizing ambivalence as an indispensable need to decide, and as 
immediacy of conflict, allows us to picture how ambiguity and decision-
making may be juxtaposed and woven together, since ambivalence is 
both the end and the visibility of ambiguity. Ambivalence may then be 
understood as the manifestation of ambiguity. It reveals that ambigui-
ties are at the same time interrupted and illuminated. Hence, ambiva-
lence and ambiguity are two parts of an interrelated ensemble – an 
assemblage – that is constituted through practices, judgements, and 
action. Exposing ambivalence in this manner (alluded to in the equation 
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ambivalence = ambiguity + decision), allows one to emphasize four cru-
cial conceptional aspects:
 First, I would like to highlight the moments of practice, action, and 
becoming, and therefore ambivalence’s transformative force. Relating 
ambivalence and ambiguity does not draw on the idea of static ensem-
bles. Rather, ambivalence indicates both a transitional and a revealing 
moment: ambivalence is transitional in so far as judgements and deci-
sions transform the virtual conflictual potential of ambiguity into the 
immediate force of conflict. It is revealing because it is in the moment of 
decision-making that ambiguity is unfolded as ambivalence. Within the 
moment of decision-making, contradictions become striking and visible 
while, at the same time, the moment itself is altered. Lefebvre writes: 
‘decision simplifies the complex situation and the ambiguity, and by the 
very act of simplifying them, transforms them. […] And that is when 
ambiguity reveals itself to be what it is: uncontrolled complexity, confu-
sion, opaqueness.’68 It is this moment of decision-making that points to 
the idea of praxis, instituting a juxtaposition between ambiguity and 
judgement.
 Second, acting, deciding, and the transformative force also reveal a 
temporal dimension. This dimension transpires not only in featuring 
transformation, but also in Lefebvre’s description of a permanent, con-
tinuous play where conditions of ambiguity are constantly and repeat-
edly interrupted by actions. On the one hand, Lefebvre stresses that 
modifications are an effect of decisions. Ambiguities are not only inter-
rupted through moments of decision but are also simplified and trans-
formed. On the other hand, he draws attention to the insight that, 
despite these decisions and simplifications, ambiguities also keep return-
ing, though never fully identically. Interruptions are instantaneous, not 
infinite, and as such they indicate an event and a transformation at the 
same time.
 Third, I would like to highlight the equation ambivalence = ambi-
guity + decision in terms of conceptualizing ambiguity as the condition 
of possibility for ambivalence/decisions. I do not claim that thinking of 
ambivalence as a mode of decision implies an endless possibility of 
choices. Neither do I suggest that Lefebvre’s emphasis on acting and 
deciding should be understood as certainty in opposition to the uncer-
tainties of ambiguity. Here, ambivalence and ambiguity allude to the 
figures of multistability and multiplicity. Engaging ambivalence in rela-
tion to ambiguity is meaningful in a double way: it stresses the point 
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that through practices, the conditions of these practices may also be 
revealed and made visible. Hence, focusing on practices not only sheds 
light on actions and decisions, but also illuminates their conditions of 
possibility. Furthermore, emphasizing these conditions also embraces 
the limits of possible decisions. Echoing multistability, theorizing deci-
sions in the light of ambivalence highlights how decisions are always 
connected to the demands and forces of a particular historical moment.
 Fourth, emphasizing decisions leads us to the question and possibil-
ity of making adequate decisions. Lefebvre denies such a possibility and 
concedes that, ‘according to the circumstances and conjunctures, deci-
sions begin with an assessment which, to a certain extent, runs the risk 
of making a mistake in the present and of failing in the future’.69 For 
him, decisions neither take place in a social vacuum, nor rely on total 
knowledge at a certain moment. This argument can further be grounded 
if we return to the first volume of the Critique of Everyday Life, where 
Lefebvre offers a thoughtful reading that illuminates both the relative 
contingency and the embeddedness of decisions. Referring to Bertolt 
Brecht’s idea of the Verfremdungseffekt, Lefebvre attempts to elucidate 
the coexistence of the need to decide and of the impossibility to make 
clear-cut decisions. For Brecht’s epic theatre, Lefebvre explains, does not 
offer perfect figures for the audience to identify with. Rather, they are to 
some extent ‘unsympathetic, irritating’, and produce ‘disagreement, 
divergence, distortion’.70 The audience, however, is forced into the 
plays; it ‘cannot relax’ but must ‘take sides’. After weighing the possibil-
ities, spectators have to decide and therefore become ‘the living con-
sciousness of the contradictions of the real’.71
A M B I V A L E N C E  A N D  T H E  P O L I T I C A L
Ambivalence and ambiguity – as I have argued with Lefebvre – are not 
separable, but are related to each other, revealing their interconnections 
through practices, actions, and decisions. Taking up this conceptualiza-
tion, I will in this last section return to the question of how such a con-
cept of ambivalence inspires a theory of the political. Exploring Lefeb-
vre’s notion of ambivalence, I emphasize the question of agency, 
mapped through a perspective on subjects, power, structures, and strate-
gies.
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 Embracing decision is one of Lefebvre’s crucial elements towards 
conceptualizing ambivalence and ambiguity.72 I suggest a notion of deci-
sion as part of a theory of the political, without claiming that all deci-
sions are political. Instead, I argue that integrating the conceptual 
potential of decision helps to acknowledge a perspective on the subjects 
for a theory of the political. For such a theory should not only investi-
gate power in terms of structures and its relations, but should also take 
into account that (and also how) subjects, as well as their actions, deci-
sions, and practices are part of these relations. Theorizing decisions 
under conditions of ambiguity provides a way of thinking about how 
individuals perpetuate and alter their own living and political condi-
tions at the same time. This understanding also resonates with Lefeb-
vre’s framework, where he does not start from an autonomous subject 
and does not fall prey to the fantasy of a sovereign life. Subjects are 
rather conceived as subjects in a world. They are not completely inten-
tional subjects, but agents who are simultaneously passive and active. 
While they are pulled into certain conditions, conditions they have 
themselves neither chosen nor produced, they are obliged to make deci-
sions and choose certain positions. Lefebvre does not stop at the micro-
political level, but considers individual decisions and actions as deeply 
embedded in particular conditions. For him, individuals are part of 
these relations and may attach to, adapt, or even dismiss certain situa-
tions. Thus, subjects are directly involved in political and social contra-
dictions and not merely neutral bearers of complex situations. This 
understanding of agency also transpires in Lefebvre’s theory of everyday 
life in which he asks how capitalism – in his terms neo-capitalism – not 
only enters, but is also invested in the everyday practices of the ordi-
nary. As Alice Kaplan and Kristin Ross have explained: ‘The Political 
[…] is hidden in the everyday, exactly where it is most obvious: in the 
contradictions of lived experience.’73
 While emphasizing individuals’ ambivalent involvement in power 
relations exposes the question of the subject, it also refers to impedi-
ments related to political, economic, and ideological structures. Individ-
uals are thrown into conditions they have not created themselves. But 
they contribute to affirming as well as altering these conditions in their 
daily practices. As Homi Bhabha has argued, power relations do not 
stay exactly the same. Ambivalence, like the figure of multistability, 
identifies the potentialities of an opening while, at the same time, repro-
ducing certain power structures.
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 Decisions and practices mark, as I have developed, the possibility, 
but also the need to choose and to make a judgement. This does not 
imply the possibility of choosing everything. Lefebvre neither assumes 
that decisions are taken under neutral conditions, nor postulates that 
decisions merely rely on having sufficient time or thorough knowledge. 
Instead, he emphasizes a need to decide despite the impossibility of con-
sidering ‘all’ possible pros and cons. This means that he does not simply 
refer to the possibility, but also to the necessity, of decision-making. He 
reveals a powerful dimension, a coercive mode in daily practices, in 
which people have to take decisions continuously, whether they like it 
or not – without theorizing the literal form of attachment to political, 
economic, and ideological structures. Thinking of ambivalence as the 
necessary interruption of ambiguity negates the idea of wilfulness and, 
instead, illustrates a dimension of requirement and even coercion at 
work in such instances.
 The suggestion of theorizing the political from the perspective of 
the subjects’ practices and decisions connects to current understandings 
of the political as taking decisions under conditions of undecidability. 
Whereas these current debates emphasize the dimension of undecidabil-
ity, arguing for the impossibility of final grounds, I shift the view to the 
aspect of decisions, emphasizing what Engel also acknowledges: ‘One 
cannot avoid taking actions.’74 Like her, I want to stress the contingency 
of particular actions and decisions. As I have argued, decisions are not 
conceptualized as results of extensive reasoning. Following Lefebvre, 
they are also the effects of the very necessity to decide, providing there-
fore a critique of totality, rationality, and coherence. 
 Lefebvre’s approach to ambivalence and ambiguity also helps to 
transgress ‘linguistic propositions’75 or a ‘fetishism of form’76 and in-
stead introduces a material dimension. Lefebvre explicitly places ambiv-
alences within daily practices. In line with Marx, he emphasizes ‘real 
individuals’ in their ‘real life-process’.77 Following this practical turn, his 
approach may challenge current theories of the political. While these 
approaches, highlighting the impossibilities of final grounds, distinguish 
between a kind of metaphysical sphere of ‘the political’ in opposition to 
the sphere of ‘politics’, all the while privileging the former, Lefebvre’s 
vision of ambivalence as grounded in daily practices allows for theoriz-
ing the political from the point of view of individuals’ daily lives, their 
activities, and the material conditions under which they live. Lefebvre’s 
assemblage of ambivalence and ambiguity speaks less of metaphysical 
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claims and rather offers a theory of practices that takes the political and 
economic conditions of these practices into account.
 Furthermore, Lefebvre’s definition of ambivalence embodies within 
itself a dimension of conflict. His framework reveals a tension between 
decision-making and ambiguous (for example, political, economic, and 
ideological) conditions. Recalling the figures of multiplicity and multi-
stability I have argued for an interrelated understanding: one that not 
only highlights plurality, but also reflects that some possibilities are 
more likely than others, and that different standpoints, mechanisms, 
and possibilities may also be in conflict with each other. Also, the com-
plex ambivalence–ambiguity logic as suggested by Lefebvre does not 
claim an endless plurality of possibilities. It assumes permanent tensions 
between ambiguities and decisions being made. Theorizing ambivalence 
as decision plus ambiguity embraces the idea of a situation where par-
ticular ambivalences become apparent. This points at the necessity to 
bring to light existing and often disempowering closures in particular 
situations, calling for a critique of existing power relations. It asks for 
the sites and situations where these relations, norms, and constraints 
become visible and coercive in everyday practices.
 Considering ambivalence as a moment where multiple and incoher-
ent (in Lefebvre’s terminology) ambiguous conditions are brought to 
light, finally provides crucial insights for theorizing political strategies. 
A politics of ambivalence neither suggests legitimizing ambivalences – 
such as those between freedom and responsibility, which are constitu-
tive of neoliberal politics – nor suggests making them coherent. Nor 
does it allude to proclaiming ambivalence as a normative principle. 
Lefebvre argues that in the immediacy of certain situations – which I 
suggested calling ambivalence – ambiguities collapse while also becom-
ing visible. Hence, a politics of ambivalence foregrounds the revelation 
of power relations as, for instance, heteronormativity. It accentuates the 
need for tracking contradictory forces and bringing them to light. 
Unlike a politics of paradox, ambivalence does not refer to a political 
goal, but instead emphasizes unfolding, even disturbing, moments of 
manifestation. Thinking the political through ambivalence allows us to 
ask where, how, and under which conditions contradictions operate. 
Only then is it possible to ask whether particular ambivalences are not 
only coercive, but also politically emancipatory and therefore should be 
kept alive.
 
 F I G U R I N G  A M B I VA L E N C E 211
 Conceptualizing ambivalence as an informative political notion 
enables a reworking of the political in terms of decisions and political 
agency. This neither assumes an over-reliance on the event nor on the 
individual’s political potentiality. Relating ambivalence and ambiguity 
from the site of the everyday allows us to theorize how subjects are 
binding and bound to particular situations and events. It accounts for 
the complex and contradictory conditions that individuals are encoun-
tering, accommodating, and shaping, and emphasizes a materialist, pro-
cess-oriented understanding of the political.
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